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Automobile Design: Evidence
Catching Up With The Law
By RALPH NADER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed the steady decline of doctrinal
obstacles to the liability of manufacturers for harm caused by
defective products.' The resulting expansion of enabling principles
in the area of products liability extends to the theory of negligent
design,' which in turn embraces the potential liability of the auto-
mobile manufacturer for the unsafe design of his product.' Indeed,
the major barrier to recovery under this theory lies not in finding law
to support the doctrine, but rather in ferreting out the existing
evidence in order to make use of the law.
Despite the growth of common law principles facilitating
recovery from manufacturers on theories of negligence, breach of
warranty, and strict tort liability, and despite the great frequency of
vehicular accidents and casualties, there has not been an accompany-
ing development of case law in the automobile design area.' The
fundamental reason is that trial attorneys have assumed far too
long that the blanket responsibility for both accident and injury
*Member, Connecticut and Massachusetts Bars; A.B., Princeton, 1955; LL.B., Harvard
Law School, 1958.
'The three landmark decisions are MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382,
iii N.E. 1050 (1916) (negligence); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32
N.J. 358, 161 A. 2d 69 (1960) (implied warranty) ; Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 67, 377 P. 2d 897 (1963) (strict liability in tort).
" See Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a Product,
71 YALE L.J. 816 (1962).
See Katz, Liability of Automobile Manufacturers for Unsafe Design of Passenger
Cars, 69 HARV. L.REv. 836 (1956).
Cases holding the manufacturer liable for unsafe vehicle design include Carpini v.
Pittsburgh & Weirton Bus. Co., 216 F. 2d 404 (3d Cir. 1954) (negligent design
of braking system); Goullon v. Ford Motor Co., 44 F. 2d 310 (6th Cir. 1930)
negligent design of tractor steering wheel) ; Hyatt v. Hyster, 106 F. Supp. 676
(S.D.N.Y. 1952) (negligent design of fork lift truck) ; Railway Express Agency v.
Spain, 249 S.W. 2d 644 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) (negligent design of truck door) ;
Zahn v. Ford Motor Co., 164 F. Supp. 936 (D. Minn. 1958) (negligent design
and/or construction of ashtray). See also Blitzstein v. Ford Motor Co., 288 F. 2d
738 (5th Cir. 1961) which found the distributor liable for failing to inspect an
imported vehicle and warn of design defect leading to dangerous concentration of
gasoline vapor.
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belongs to the driver.' They have neglected the role of the automo-
bile not only as a culpable factor in the accident (the "first colli-
sion"), but also as a direct contributor to the injury (the "second
collision"). While the automobile may not be a primary factor in
all first collisions - the impacting of the car - it is definitely a
primary factor in nearly all of the second collisions - when occu-
pants are thrown against the interior of the vehicle.
The basic reason for this failure of trial attorneys to consider
vehicle design, even when their client has no other prospect for
recovery, can be traced to the fact that automobile products liability
cases involve investigation on two levels distinct in space and time.
First there must be an investigation of the situs of the accident and
second, a gathering of external evidence to show the creation of an
unreasonable risk by the manufacturer through faulty product design.
The latter investigation is seldom effectively undertaken by
plaintiff's counsel. Most counsel are simply unfamiliar with the
sources of engineering information and the techniques of deposing
defendant-manufacturer's employees.' Alertness to this second level
of inquiry leads counsel to a more critical scrutiny and handling of
the first level at the accident scene. It is of the utmost importance,
for example, to maintain custody of the damaged vehicle for identi-
fication of the injurious design and the pattern of injury to the client.
Far too often, the vehicle is towed away to the junk yard or to the
repair shop for resale on the used car market.
In the past two years, there have been solid indications of a
growing recognition of human engineering data and concepts and
their use in the courtroom. A leading authority, Professor Ross A.
McFarland,7 characterizes the role of human engineering in highway
safety in these terms:
Many characteristics of the driver are relevant to highway safety,
'An outstanding and burgeoning exception has been the recent Corvair litigation.
See Ridgeway, Car Design and Public Safety, THE NEW REPUBLIC 9 (Sept. 19,
1964). Over one hundred suits involving Corvairs have been brought throughtout
the nation, and more than thirty of these cases are presently pending in the Los
Angeles, California, Superior Court. Nearly all of these cases allege that the Corvair
(1960 to 1964 models) is designed as an inherently unstable vehicle with hazardous
handling characteristics under conditions of anticipated use. General Motors denies
all allegations of negligence, but it did settle the first Corvair case after three days
of trial in June 1964 for $70,000. Pierini v. General Motors Corp., and Washburn
Chevrolet (Superior Court, Santa Barbara, Calif.). See also, Sekelik v. Ford Motor Co.,
Civil No. 61-464, W.D. Pa. April 1963 (Jury verdict of $25,000 for plaintiff who
claimed negligence in the laminating process leading to breakage of the Fo-Mo-Co glass
in left front door of 1959 Ford). See, Nader, Patent Laws Prime Source to Secure
Safer Auto Design, 1 TRIAL 26 (Dec. 1964). But see note 24 infra.
'Nader, Lawyers Asked to Research Auto Design, NACCA PI&E BULL 13 (April
1963).
Professor of Environmental Safety, School of Public Health, Harvard University.
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but it must be remembered that the vehicle and certain aspects of
the environment are generally more amenable to control than driver
characteristics and in some cases show more promise of immediate
and specific gains in accident reduction. It is in the control of the
vehicle and the driving environment that the human engineer can
make his unique and most important contribution to highway
safety.8
The rapidly developing field of human engineering (or opti-
mum man-machine interaction), sparked by military and space
research and development, is of signal importance to counsel in
automobile products liability cases. Particularly since World War
II's termination and the onset of federal grants for such research,
non-industry scientists, engineers, and physicians have published
materials dealing candidly with the measures for adapting the ve-
hicle to the needs of the driving task and the protection of the
occupants during a collision.' Their findings have opened new
aspects of the manufacturer's duty of care to those affected by his
products. They also illuminate the necessity for more thorough
accident investigation"° - an important part of which is simply the
'McFarland, The Role of Human Engineering in Highway Safety, in HUMAN FACTORS
IN TECHNOLOGY 213 (Bennett, Degan & Spiegel eds. 1963). Other authorities lend
support to this view, e.g.: Research, Report of the President's Committee for Traffic
Safety, 1961, where it is said at p. 19 that a fundamental principle of safety engi-
neering is to "anticipate every type of accident which may occur because of machine
or human failure and then establish safeguards to eliminate the hazard or minimize
the injury when failure occurs."
A leading General motors safety engineer had this to say:
One of the fundamental principles of safety engineering is to anticipate
every possible type of accident which may occur because of mechanical
failure or human failure and then to establish safeguards to minimize the
hazard or injury which may result when such a failure occurs .... Our
predecessors had pioneered in safety engineering by taking fundamental
steps to avoid accidents, but they did not apply the second concept of the
industrial safety engineer, to provide all safeguards in the event that an
accident occurred because of human fallibility.
Kenneth A. Stonex, in TRAFFIC SAFETY RESEARCH REVIEW at p. 18 (National Safety
Council, 1961). This rare expression by an automobile industry spokesman is
strongly directed to improving the safety of occupants in the "second collision."
'See bibliographies in McFarland, id. at 81-85, 228-29, 245-46, 266-67, 282-83. Two
recent and specifically informative papers are: Huelke & Gikas, How Do They Die?
Medical-Engineering Data From On-Scene Investigations of Fatal Automobile Acci-
dents, Society of Automotive Engineers paper 1003A, Jan. 1965; and Patrick, Human
Tolerance to Impact - Basis for Safety Design, Society of Automotive Engineers
Paper 1003B, Jan. 1965. A compilation in abstract form of the Cornell research,
"Abstracts of ACIR Studies 1954 to January 1964," is obtainable from Cornell
Aeronautical Laboratory, P.O. Box 235, Buffalo, New York. A detailed source book
for information on automobile safety is Robb & Philo, LAWYERS DESK REFERENCE
1965, INFORMATION: WHAT TO FIND, WHERE TO FIND IT 1965 (Rochester, N.Y.:
Lawyers Coop. Pub. Co., 1965).
A highly useful and detailed manual for accident investigation and analysis is Baker.
TRAFFIC ACCIDENT INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL FOR POLICE (The Traffic Institute,
Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill. 1963).
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attribution of new significance to hitherto neglected or subordinated
facts."
As Professor McFarland notes:
[A]ccident reports generally have failed to identify difficulties in
man-machine integration as accident causes. Design failures may be
so subtle that those responsible for reporting accidents may not be
aware of them, particularly if the personnel are not trained in
human engineering. However, if defects are present, it is only a
matter of time before some driver "fails" and has an accident. 12
The basic obstacle to increased effective use of the concepts of
human engineering in the courtroom is the problem of perfecting
the structure and flow of information to counsel, much as was done
in the post-war period for forensic medicine."
II. THE MUNCY AND MICKLE CASES
Two recent cases handled by small law firms in relatively rural
areas of the country reveal that the problems of access to these evi-
dential requisites are by no means insurmountable.
In Muncy v. General Motors Corp.,4 the plaintiff-pedestrian
was struck by a runaway automobile while she was standing on a
sidewalk. The vehicle had lurched over the curb when a disembark-
ing passenger inadvertently struck the accelerator pedal with her
foot. The driver, prior to alighting, had removed the key from the
ignition thinking that by doing so she had shut off the car's motor.
In the first trial on the merits, plaintiff's emphasis rested on a stuck
Ibid. Consider the following failure to use human engineering, particularly where
there is no clear instruction or warning to the driver:
Owners of many new automobiles were cautioned that under certain cir-
circumstances the "parking brake" on their car might appear firmly set, but
still allow it to roll backwards freely. The Association of Casualty and
Surety Companies advises that this can be especially dangerous if a driver
parks his car in the family driveway, many of which slope. The insurance
organization said this condition arises because of recent changes in the de-
sign of the parking or emergency brake system of nearly all passenger cars
and many light trucks. If the parking brake is set without the simultaneous
application of the hydraulic service (foot) brakes, the bottom of the brake
shoes are brought into contact with the drums on the rear wheels, but the
shoes are not fully engaged. With the parking brake in this condition, the
Association says, the car cannot roll forward, but it can move freely to the
rear. If, on the other hand, the motorist is pressing his foot on the hy-
draulic brake while he is setting the parking brake, the shoe and drum
engage completely and the car will move. As a safety precaution, the
Association urges motorists to get into the habit of applying the foot brake
while they set the parking brake.
Sajety Newsletter, Automotive and Machine Shop Section (Oak Ridge National
Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tenn., Oct. 1963). This is a condition where, given a
backsliding vehicle and injury, driver "carelessness" can more fundamentally be
analyzed as a product of engineering carelessness.
'2 McFarland, supra note 8, at 215.
'See 2 BELLI, MODERN TRIALS §§ 268-279 (1954).
'*Civil No. 906, E.D. Tex., Marshall Div., April 10, 1964. (An appeal is pending
in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.)
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accelerator claim. It was alleged that this condition was attributable
to General Motors' workmanship. A hung jury led to re-trial of the
case in April, 1964, when the emphasis was shifted to the defective
design of the ignition switch. The complaint against General Motors
alleged improper design of the ignition switch in that it permitted
the withdrawal of the ignition key while the motor of the automo-
bile was running and the vehicle was in gear. This time the jury
returned a verdict against the defendant, General Motors.
Muncy is a graphic example of the use of previously neglected
sources of evidence to establish a case of liability based on the
manufacturers' neglect to consider human engineering in the design
of his products. Plaintiff's counsel proceeded on a fundamental
premise of human engineering - namely that the design of auto-
motive equipment should strive for maximum compatibility with
human motor and perceptual capabilities. 5
Examination of expert witnesses for General Motors produced
admissions that "human factor" (or human engineering) designing
was recognized and that when the automatic transmission was first
installed with this ignition switch design, the precaution was taken
of arranging the gear lever so that the motor could not be started
with the automatic transmission in gear. This was followed by an
admission from the designer of the switch that the danger of one
inadvertently leaving the car in gear with the motor running when
the ignition key was withdrawn was taken into account when the
automatic transmission was put into use (soon after World War II),
but was considered too remote to require a re-design of the switch.
The plaintiff's counsel made advantageous use of patents in
the area of ignition switch design and instrument controls held by
The growing emphasis by accident researchers on the safety engineering responsibility
of the highway system to drivers, whose misjudgment is so often a function of
engineering defects in the vehicle-highway system, is reflected in the following re-
marks by the Federal Highway Administrator:
Perhaps the time has come to examine some of our present safety programs
and some of our present safety concepts. The truth, as I see it, may be
painful.
Accident records as they are now collected show driver failure as the prin-
cipal cause of most traffic accidents. Yet we know that we can and do
design freeways with fine safety records. Isn't this some evidence that
often the driver is not really at fault in an accident? In many cases haven't
we given the driver a task beyond the capacity of his senses, nerves, and
muscles?
We must face up squarely to this premise: the majority of drivers are per-
forming as well as we can reasonably expect, under existing conditions.
From that premise it is logical to reason that the conditions must be changed
- we must improve the road, the vehicle, and the basic control measures
of the system.
Address by Rex M. Whitton, National Safety Congress, Conrad Hilton Hotel, Chi-
cago, Ill., Oct. 28, 1963.
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General Motors and others in presenting his case. Employment of
these patents represented an unprecedented pre-trial and trial tech-
nique in automobile products liability litigation. Not only were they
highly informative as to the "state of the art" and various alterna-
tives in ignition switch design, but they also facilitated locating the
General Motors experts in this field for testimony at trial. Further,
they provided a basis for conducting more thorough examinations
of defendant's employees. Finally, the trial record shows that, over
defense counsel's objections, a General Motors patent was offered
into evidence to show the company's awareness of the need for
anticipation of driver error or miscalculation in the design of con-
trols. This was patent Number 2,929,261 (Charles Chayne, assignor
to General Motors) which states that vehicle controls
must not only be easily operated but also accessible to the operator
with a minimum of inconvenience. Furthermore, safety is a con-
cern since the control must be of the type that an operator would
not inadvertently operate under normal conditions.
While in the Muncy case faulty engineering design was shown
to be the cause of the accident which then led to the injury (the
first collision), the case of Mickle v. Blackmon, Cherokee Const.
Co., and Ford Motor Co."6 was based on the premise that although
the collision between the two cars involved was not the fault of
engineering, the resulting injury (the product of the "second colli-
sion") was. Plaintiff, a 17-year-old girl, was riding in the front seat
of a 1949 Ford. The car entered an intersection and collided with
another vehicle at a speed estimated to have been between twenty
and twenty-five miles per hour. Plaintiff was thrown against the
gear shift lever by the force of the collision. The lever entered her
back just under the left shoulder blade and penetrated her spinal
cord, rendering her a paraplegic. Suit was brought against the driver
of the other vehicle and Ford Motor Co., for unsafe design and
manufacture of the gear shift lever on which plaintiff was impaled.
Plaintiff sought to prove six points in support of her allegation
against Ford that the design of the shift lever was unsafe:
(1) The lever protruded substantially beyond the rim of the
steering wheel - needlessly increasing its potential to injure in the
event of an accident. In support of this the actual steering column
of the vehicle in question was introduced into evidence.
(2) The knob which the defendant installed on the exposed
" Circuit Ct., 6th Judicial Cir., York County, S.C., March 1963.
" It was shown that the bottom half had three supporting braces to a core which held
the ball upon the lever and that the top half was completely hollow. The halves
were adhered together by glue.
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end of the lever did not provide an adequate and safe protective
guard. The knob - a thin, plastic, round ball made in two parts -
was introduced into evidence." Testimony was introduced showing
that in the 1951 Ford, a knob was used that was twice as thick as
the one used in the 1949 model and was made of material which
did not crystallize into fault or craze lines as did the knob used in
1949.18
(3) The method used by Ford to fasten the knob to the gear
shift lever actually facilitated the knob slipping down the lever
when struck. This point was substantiated by the use of an engi-
neering expert, the garageman who kept custody of the vehicle,
and a large photograph.
(4) Ford Motor Co. did not employ a shoulder or collar in
the design of its lever to prevent the knob from sliding down the
rod when struck, leaving the end of the lever exposed and unshielded.
(5) Other automobile manufacturers, in designing their gear
shift levers, did not allow the lever to project so far beyond the rim of
the steering wheel; used threads or splines, in circular grooves, to
secure the protective shield (knobs) on the gear shift lever; and
provided a shoulder or collar to prevent the knob from sliding down
the lever and exposing the end of it.
(6) Experts who testified at the trial were of the opinion that
the design and construction of the gear shift lever and knob by
Ford was unsafe.
The jury returned a verdict against Ford Motor Co. for injury
cause. The driver of the vehicle was exonerated.
III. CONCLUSION
The Mickle case illustrates in detail both the conceptual and
evidential impact of the accident-injury research findings made by
researchers at various universities over the past fifteen years. Indeed,
a chief expert witness for the plaintiff, John 0. Moore, was formerly
director of the Cornell project which for over a decade has col-
lected and analyzed motor vehicle injury statistics from many states
in order to determine the pattern of occupant-injury inside the
vehicle. It has been the Cornell data1" which has pinpointed the
leading instrumentalities of injury in a vehicle. These were found
'Plaintiff referred to Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown, 291 F. 2d 310 (9th Cir. 1961)
as authority for making the comparison to the later knobs.
Abstracts of ACIR Studies 1954 to January 1964. Leading causes of injury cited by
Cornell are discussed in Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on Traffic Safety




to be: the steering assembly, the door latch (failure), the instrument
panel, the rearview mirror, the seat anchorage (failure), and the
windshield.
The empirical distinction between accident cause and injury
cause - accidents do not per se cause injuries - adds an entirely
new dimension to the trial of automobile cases. It opens up a vast
area for counsel to present in the courtroom the premises and evi-
dence of human engineering research results. Products liability
doctrine can be viewed as the normative side of human engineering
principles. When the human engineer shows, for example, how it is
possible to build automobiles which are safer in case of accident,
products liability doctrine then measures this feasibility against legal
concepts of duty and standards of care. In addition, as more scien-
tific engineering knowledge is made available, the normative con-
cepts of products liability law are likely to develop with greater
precision and comprehensiveness," Such a maturing process, en-
visaged by the old adage of Roman law - ex facto ius oritur (out
of the fact comes the law) - has been observable in the products
liability cases of the past decade wherein courts have liberalized
the scope of warranty and diminished the citadel of privity.
IV. EPILOGUE
It is significant that the vector of such an evolution points
toward a fulfillment of a basic purpose of tort law - deterrence
of the injurious activity. The deterrence function of tort liability is
now rather soundly debunked by commentators who view it largely
as a myth employed in law school courses to round out a pedagogi-
cal repertory. These writers may be approaching reality insofar as
driver and pedestrian behavior are concerned,"' but that is by no
means the entire picture. A major factor in accidents between auto-
mobiles and between automobiles and pedestrians, is an engineering
accomplishment - the motor vehicle. It appears that decisions ad-
verse to particular engineering designs employed in manufacturing
such vehicles would have a substantial deterrent effect on the manu-
facturers. Let the recent design of the vehicle fin structure illustrate
the point. For a period of several years, beginning in 1957 for
2OSee e.g., Safety-Like-For Humans, Man, PRODUCT ENGINEERING, April 27,
1964, pp. 100-101; Automobile-Tire Safety, 111 CONG. REc. 5717 (daily ed.
March 25, 1965) (Commentary on the unpublished Federal Trade Commission
hearings on tires in January 1965); Campbell, Twenty-Three Fatal Crashes With
Seat Belts, PROCEEDINGS, SEVENTH STAPP CAR CRASH CONFERENCE, (Springfield,
Ill.: Charles Thomas, 1965); CONSUMER REPORTS, April 1965, pp. 168-82; Hear-
ings on Motor Vehicle Safety Before a Subcommittee on Health and Safety, of the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong. 1st Sess. (1959).
See James & Dickinson, Accident Proneness and Accident Law, 63 HARv. L. REV.
769 (1950).
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most models, automobiles were produced with fins of varying ex-
aggeration with numerous models sporting severely tapered points
upon which many pedestrians have been impaled. It is doubtful that
public buildings could be built anywhere in this country with such
spikes protruding toward passersby. Yet there is no legal bar against
mobile, two-ton machines from being so equipped.22 Were liability
to -be imposed upon manufacturers for the negligent design of these
functionless structures and other projections such as hood ornaments,
it is believed that a remedying change in design would have occurred
much sooner.2
This likelihood stems from the desire of a profit-maximizing
firm to avoid: (1) incurring non-budgeted costs applicable to past
behavior, (2) receiving adverse publicity, and (3) alerting propon-
ents of public regulation to an additional hazard. For the manu-
facturer, the mechanics of the deterrence are much simpler than for
the driver. It is obviously much easier to control the design of a
vehicle than it is to control the behavior of 92 million operators
driving 800 billion miles a year.
' Wakeland, Systematic Automobile Design for Pedestrian Injury Prevention, PRO-
CEEDINGS, FIFTH STAPP AUTOMOTIVE CRASH AND FIELD DEMONSTRATION CON-
FERENCE, September 1961, pp. 193-218 (University of Minnesota, Center for Con-
tinuation Study, 1962).
' In the absence of any company statement, it may be speculated that the increasing
litigation over the Corvair had a role in the decision by General Motors to redesign
the independent rear suspension system in the 1965 models. For a description of
the new design, see '65 Corvairs, SPORTS CAR GRAPHIC, October 1964, pp. 26-29.
This speculation is enforced by the fact that the suspension design in the '65 Corvairs
does not constitute an innovation but was known to the company for many years.
See Patent #3,020,061 held by GM and references contained therein. See also,
CORVAIR PERFORMANCE HANDBOOK (Petersen Publishing Co., Los Angeles, 1963).
See note 5 supra. In the first trial involving the Corvair design, the jury returned a
verdict in favor of General Motors. The plaintiff had alleged that a fatal highway
accident had been caused by defective design of the Corvair's rear-swing axle. Collins
v. General Motors Corp. (Santa Clara County, Calif., Superior Court, Aug. 11, 1965)
in The Denver Post, Aug. 11, 1965, p. 37, col. 5.
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